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the Board of Immigration Appeals 
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Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
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____________ 
Counsel for Respondent 
 
OPINION  
___________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge
 
. 
Mohammed Shuaib Khan (“Mohammed”) and his son 
Faras Shuaib Khan (“Faras”), both citizens of Pakistan, 
petition for review of an order by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying their motion for an emergency stay 
of removal and motion to reopen their joint application for 
asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).  
Respondent United States Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. 
has moved to dismiss the petition for review, arguing that we 
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lack jurisdiction to consider it because it was untimely and 
because it was filed before the BIA rendered a final decision 
on the petitioners’ motions.  We hold that we do have 
jurisdiction.  We will, therefore, deny the Attorney General’s 
motion to dismiss.  However, we will also deny the petition 
for review. 
 
I. 
 
The petitioners initially were admitted to the United 
States as nonimmigrant visitors in December 1990.  After 
they overstayed their visas, the United States Immigration and 
Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings.  
Mohammed sought asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the CAT, claiming that he was persecuted in 
Pakistan based on his membership in the Pakistan People’s 
Party.  Faras, who was a minor, was listed as a derivative 
beneficiary on Mohammed’s asylum application.  In January 
2000, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the petitioners’ 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the CAT because they presented no credible 
evidence of past persecution or fear of future persecution.  
The BIA affirmed the denial on February 25, 2003, and the 
petitioners did not petition this Court for review of that 
denial.  Instead, on October 21, 2010 — seven and one-half 
years later — they filed with the BIA a motion for an 
emergency stay of removal and a motion to reopen their case.   
 
 In the subsequent weeks, this case followed a 
somewhat unusual timeline.  On March 29, 2011, the 
petitioners prematurely filed in this Court a petition for 
review, challenging the BIA’s alleged refusal to adjudicate 
their motion for an emergency stay of removal and motion to 
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reopen.  The petition was filed within hours of Mohammed’s 
scheduled removal from the United States and after a clerk at 
the BIA allegedly notified the petitioners that the BIA would 
not consider their motion for an emergency stay of removal.  
On the same day, a panel of this Court granted the petitioners 
a temporary stay of removal and ordered the parties to submit 
briefs addressing this Court’s jurisdiction over the petition for 
review.  Thereafter, on March 31, 2011, the Attorney General 
moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction, arguing 
that we were without jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition 
because it was (1) untimely with respect to the BIA’s 
February 2003 decision and (2) premature with respect to the 
BIA’s anticipated decision on the petitioners’ motion for an 
emergency stay of removal and motion to reopen.  
 
 All of this occurred before the BIA issued a final 
decision on the petitioners’ October 2010 motions.  Finally, 
on April 12, 2011, the BIA denied the petitioners’ October 
2010 motion to reopen because it was untimely and also 
denied the motion for an emergency stay of removal.  The 
following week, on April 18, 2011, the petitioners moved for 
leave to amend their response to the motion to dismiss in 
order to address this Court’s jurisdiction in light of the April 
12, 2011 BIA order.  The next day, a panel of this Court 
granted the motion to amend, referred the motion to dismiss 
to a merits panel, and vacated the temporary stay of removal 
entered on March 29, 2011 because the petitioners had not 
shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their petition 
for review.  We now consider whether we have jurisdiction 
and, if so, whether the petitioners are entitled to relief. 
 
II. 
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The Attorney General contends that the petition for 
review should be dismissed because it was filed almost two 
weeks prior to the BIA’s April 12, 2011 denial of the 
petitioners’ motions, making it premature and depriving this 
Court of jurisdiction.1  We have jurisdiction to review the 
BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen unless 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2) otherwise strips us of jurisdiction.  Cruz v. Att’y 
Gen.
                                              
1  The Attorney General also argues that we lack 
jurisdiction over the petition for review because it was filed 
more than thirty days after the BIA’s February 2003 final 
order of removal.  Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), a 
petition for review must be filed no later than thirty days after 
a final order of removal.  The petitioners maintain, however, 
that they are challenging only the denial of their October 
2010 motions, not the BIA’s February 2003 denial of relief.  
Thus, we reject the Attorney General’s argument that we lack 
jurisdiction to consider the petition for review on this basis. 
, 452 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Congress has 
explicitly granted federal courts the power to review ‘any 
final order of removal’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Implicit 
in this jurisdictional grant is the authority to review the denial 
of a motion to reopen any such final order.”).  The 
Government does not argue that any of the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) deprive us of 
jurisdiction.  The petitioners set forth a number of reasons 
why we had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s alleged refusal 
to adjudicate their motions even before the April 12, 2011 
order denying the motion to reopen.  We need not address 
those arguments, however, because we conclude that we have 
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s April 12, 2011 order, despite 
the petition for review having been filed before that order was 
issued.     
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There are differing views among our sister Courts of 
Appeals with regard to whether premature petitions for 
review can ripen upon a final decision by the BIA.  The 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held 
that a premature petition for review does not ripen into a 
timely petition when the final order is eventually issued.  
Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 2007); Jaber 
v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 223, 228–30 (6th Cir. 2007).  The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in contrast, has held 
that a premature petition can ripen provided that the BIA later 
orders the petitioner removed and the Attorney General has 
not shown that he would be prejudiced.  Herrera-Molina v. 
Holder
 
, 597 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2010).  We have yet to 
decide this issue. 
We opt to follow the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit and will not dismiss the petition on the basis that it 
was filed two weeks prematurely.  We have held in civil cases 
that, where there is no showing of prejudice by the adverse 
party and we have not taken action on the merits of an appeal, 
“‘a premature notice of appeal, filed after disposition of some 
of the claims before a district court, but before entry of final 
judgment, will ripen upon the court’s disposal of the 
remaining claims.’”  DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions 
Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 215 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Lazy Oil 
Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 585 (3d Cir. 1999)).  This 
rule is referred to as the “Cape May Greene doctrine” after 
the case in which it was first recognized, Cape May Greene, 
Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 184–85 (3d Cir. 1983).  In Cape 
May Greene, the plaintiff filed its notice of appeal of the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment while a cross-
claim filed by the defendant was still pending.  Id. at 184.  
While the appeal was pending, but before we had taken any 
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action on the appeal, the parties dismissed the cross-claim and 
the district court entered a final judgment dismissing the case.  
Id.  In holding that the notice of appeal ripened upon entry of 
the final judgment, we relied on the United States Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement that “‘practical, not technical 
considerations are to govern the application of principles of 
finality.’”  Id. at 185 (quoting Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp.
 
, 
379 U.S. 148, 152 (1949)).   
Similarly, in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d at 
585, the objectors to a class action settlement filed a notice of 
appeal over two months before the district court gave its final 
approval on all elements of the settlement and entered a final 
judgment.  In choosing to apply the Cape May Greene 
doctrine, we explained that, “[f]or us to decline jurisdiction in 
this appeal would elevate a mere technicality above the 
important substantive issues here involved, as well as the 
right of the parties in this case to have their dispute resolved 
on its merits.”  Id. at 587.  Motivated by such concerns, we 
have continued to allow a premature notice of appeal to ripen 
in cases where the adverse party was not prejudiced by the 
premature filing and where we have yet to adjudicate the 
appeal.  E.g., DL Res., Inc., 506 F.3d at 215.  But see ADAPT 
of Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d 353, 361–65 (3d Cir. 
2006) (holding that the Cape May Greene doctrine is 
inapplicable to appeals from interlocutory orders, such as 
discovery orders, and that appeals from interlocutory orders 
may not ripen upon entry of final judgment).2
                                              
2  Although Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(4)(B)(ii) allows for the ripening of a notice of appeal that 
is filed while certain motions are pending once those motions 
are adjudicated, we have opined that “Rule 4 does not 
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We will apply that same rule to the circumstances 
presented in this case.  So long as the Attorney General has 
not shown that he will suffer prejudice resulting from the 
premature filing of a petition for review, and we have yet to 
take action on the merits of the appeal, a premature petition 
for review can ripen once the BIA issues a final order on a 
motion to reopen.  We see no reason to treat premature 
petitions for review from final orders of removal differently 
than we have treated premature notices of appeal in other 
types of cases.3
                                                                                                     
exclusively govern every ‘situation in which a premature 
notice of appeal will ripen at a later date.’”  DL Res., Inc., 
506 F.3d at 215 (quoting Lazy Oil Co., 166 F.3d at 587).  We 
recognize that some of our sister Courts of Appeals have 
declined to join us in this regard.  See Brown v. Columbia 
Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 188 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
“premature notices of appeal in civil cases can only ripen 
when under the auspices of [Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure] 4(a)(2), as defined by the Supreme Court in 
[FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Investors Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 
269 (1991)]”); Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & 
Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 160 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same); 
United States v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960, 963 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(applying analogous reasoning in a criminal appeal); Serine v. 
Peterson, 989 F.2d 371, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1993) (same). 
  
3 Likewise, we have exercised appellate jurisdiction in 
certain criminal cases where a notice of appeal was filed after 
conviction but before sentencing, so long as the notice of 
appeal adequately advised the government of what was being 
appealed, the premature filing did not cause prejudice, and the 
notice of appeal was not filed extraordinarily prematurely.  
See, e.g., United States v. Hashagen, 816 F.2d 899, 903–06 
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Turning to this case, we hold that the premature 
petition for review ripened and we have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate it.  While technically the petitioners should have 
filed a new petition once the BIA issued its final order on the 
motion to reopen and motion for an emergency stay of 
removal on April 12, 2011, the BIA’s decision denying the 
motions was entered only two weeks after the petitioners filed 
their petition for review and the Attorney General had plenty 
of time to respond to the petition.  The Attorney General has 
made no argument that he was prejudiced by the premature 
filing and we do not perceive any prejudice.  Although the 
petition for review challenged the BIA’s refusal to adjudicate 
the petitioners’ motions rather than the denial of those 
motions, the petitioners amended their response to the 
Attorney General’s motion to dismiss after the BIA denied 
the motions.  We will treat the petitioners’ amended response 
to the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss as updating the 
petition for review into a challenge to the BIA’s April 12, 
2011 order.  Finally, we had not taken action on the merits 
before the BIA entered its final disposition.  In these 
circumstances, we conclude that it would be unfair to dismiss 
the petition due to its premature filing.   
 
The Attorney General argues that this case is 
distinguishable from Cape May Greene and Lazy Oil Co.
                                                                                                     
(3d Cir. 1987) (en banc).  But see Gov’t of the V.I. v. 
Leonard A., 922 F.2d 1141, 1146 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding 
that notice of appeal did not ripen because it did not 
adequately notify the government of what was being 
appealed).   
, 
because those were appeals from interlocutory orders that 
later became final orders while, here, there was no order by 
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the BIA at the time the petitioners filed their petition.  We do 
not find that distinction to be dispositive in this case.  While 
there may be circumstances in which there is no order from 
the BIA and the petition is so premature that allowing it to 
ripen would prejudice the Attorney General, this is not such a 
case.  Again, the Attorney General has alleged no prejudice 
caused by the premature petition for review.  In addition, the 
petitioners allege, and the Attorney General does not deny, 
that a clerk at the BIA informed the petitioners on March 29, 
2011 that the BIA would not rule on their motion for an 
emergency stay of removal.  Given that the petitioners were 
scheduled to leave for Pakistan that day, it is understandable 
why the petitioners would interpret that message as an 
effective denial of their motion for an emergency stay of 
removal and motion to reopen.  Thus, the Attorney General’s 
proposed distinction is not compelling. 
 
We hold, therefore, that we have jurisdiction over the 
ripened petition for review and we will deny the Attorney 
General’s motion to dismiss.   
 
III. 
 
While we hold in favor of the petitioners on the 
jurisdictional question, we nonetheless conclude that they 
cannot prevail on the merits of their petition for review.  We 
review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 
discretion.  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2004).4
                                              
4  We need not address the BIA’s denial of the 
petitioners’ motion for an emergency stay of removal because 
the petitioners did not challenge that denial in their appellate 
  We will not reverse the BIA’s discretionary rulings 
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“‘unless they are found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.’”  Id. (quoting Tipu v. INS
 
, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 
1994)).  A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days 
of a final order of removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  
The petitioners do not dispute that their motion to reopen was 
untimely, as the final order of removal was entered on 
February 25, 2003 and the motion to reopen was not filed 
until October 21, 2010.  Instead, they seek application of the 
changed country conditions exception to the ninety-day 
deadline set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), which 
provides that 
[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion 
to reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply 
for relief under sections 1158 or 1231(b)(3) of 
this title and is based on changed country 
conditions arising in the country of nationality 
or the country to which removal has been 
ordered, if such evidence is material and was 
not available and would not have been 
discovered or presented at the previous 
proceeding. 
 
Sections 1158 and 1231(b)(3) — referenced above — outline 
the requirements for asylum and withholding of removal, 
respectively. 
                                                                                                     
briefs.  See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours, 372 F.3d 
193, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue is waived unless a 
party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a 
passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that 
issue before this court.” (quotation marks omitted)).   
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The petitioners seek to reopen under the changed 
country conditions exception based on allegations that 
extremist violence has increased in Pakistan; the Pakistani 
government is less able to control that violence than in 2000, 
when the petitioners had their original hearing; the petitioners 
now belong to the Awami National Party (“ANP”), which is 
targeted by extremists in Pakistan; the petitioners’ hometown 
of Bahawalpur has become more dangerous; Pakistan has 
become more anti-American since 2000; and the petitioners 
now suffer from mental illnesses.  With their motion to 
reopen, the petitioners submitted a report published on July 1, 
2009 by the University of Maryland entitled “Pakistani Public 
Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan, and the US.”  The 
report includes the results of a poll which found that 81% of 
Pakistanis believed that the Taliban and other religious 
militants constituted a “critical threat” to the country.  Two 
years earlier, only 34% percent had responded affirmatively 
to that question.  Among other documents, the petitioners also 
provided a number of articles reporting violence and 
instability in Pakistan; a 2009 United States Department of 
State Human Rights Report documenting human rights abuses 
and politically motivated killings by extremists in Pakistan; 
information on the treatment of persons with mental illness in 
Pakistan; and the petitioners’ medical records.   
 
For the changed country conditions exception in 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) to apply, the petitioners must 
show that the new evidence they submit is material to their 
application for relief.  To meet the materiality requirement, 
the petitioners must allege facts that “‘would be sufficient, if 
proved, to change the result’” of their application.  Kaur v. 
BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ballenilla-
Gonzalez v. INS, 546 F.2d 515, 520 (2d Cir. 1976)).  Even if 
13 
 
an alien can demonstrate changed country conditions, a 
motion to reopen will not be granted unless the petitioner 
establishes prima facie eligibility for relief by “produc[ing] 
objective evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that he 
can establish that he is entitled to relief.”  Guo, 386 F.3d at 
563 (quotation marks and brackets omitted); see
 
 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be 
granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to 
be offered is material . . . .”).   
To prevail on an asylum claim,5 an alien must show 
that he or she “is unable or unwilling to return to, and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, [his or her native country] because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A).  To establish a well-founded fear of 
persecution, the alien must show both a subjective fear and 
“that a reasonable person in his position would fear 
persecution, either because he would be individually singled 
out for persecution or because there is a pattern or practice in 
his home country of persecution against a group of which he 
is a member.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 381 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  “The source of the 
persecution must be the government or forces that the 
government is unwilling or unable to control.”  
                                              
5  Because the petitioners have failed to make any 
argument with regard to their claims for withholding of 
removal and relief under the CAT, we deem such arguments 
waived and we will not address them.  See Skretvedt, 372 
F.3d at 202–03. 
Ahmed v. 
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Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 2007).  In order to 
prove a reasonable fear of future persecution, the petitioners 
must produce “credible, direct, and specific evidence . . . that 
would support a reasonable fear of persecution.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  The BIA’s underlying factual 
determinations are entitled to broad deference under the 
substantial evidence standard, “and will be upheld to the 
extent [they are] supported by reasonable, substantial and 
probative evidence on the record on as a whole.”  Shardar v. 
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks 
omitted).  In considering motions to reopen, “[t]he critical 
question is . . . whether circumstances have changed 
sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a 
legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.”  Malty v. Ashcroft
 
, 381 F.3d 942, 945 
(9th Cir. 2004).   
We agree with the BIA that the petitioners cannot avail 
themselves of the changed country conditions exception in 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) to the time limit for filing a 
motion to reopen.  With respect to much of the evidence they 
submitted with their motion to reopen, the petitioners have 
not met their heavy burden of demonstrating that the evidence 
is material to their application for asylum.  The BIA held that 
the petitioners’ evidence of violence towards members of the 
Pakistan People’s Party (“PPP”) was not material to their 
asylum application because the petitioners had not addressed 
the IJ’s finding in January 2000 that there was no credible 
evidence that the petitioners belonged to the PPP.  The BIA 
did not err in reaching that conclusion.  Because the 
petitioners have not attempted to rehabilitate their credibility 
following the IJ’s adverse credibility finding with respect to 
their membership in the PPP, they have not shown “a 
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reasonable likelihood that [they] can establish that [they are] 
entitled to relief” on the basis that they would be targeted as 
members of the PPP.  Guo, 386 F.3d at 563 (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Kaur
 
, 413 F.3d at 234 (upholding BIA’s 
conclusion that the “evidence submitted by petitioner in 
support of her motion was not ‘material’ because it did not 
rebut the adverse credibility finding that provided the basis 
for the IJ’s denial of petitioner’s underlying asylum 
application.”).  Without credible evidence that the petitioners 
belonged to the PPP, the petitioners cannot prevail on an 
asylum claim based on membership in that group.   
Nor did the BIA err in relying on the IJ’s adverse 
credibility determination.  “We have emphasized that adverse 
credibility findings are afforded deference only if they are 
supported by specific cogent reasons” that are “substantial 
and bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.”  Guo, 386 F.3d at 
562–63 (quotation marks omitted).  The petitioners have not 
disputed that the adverse credibility determination was 
supported by the record.  The adverse credibility 
determination in this case was also directly relevant to the 
merits of the asylum application that the petitioners seek to 
reopen.  See id.
 
 at 563 (explaining that there must be a 
sufficient nexus between the adverse credibility finding and 
the BIA’s holding).  Thus, it was appropriate for the BIA to 
defer to the IJ’s credibility determination. 
The BIA also held that the petitioners could not avail 
themselves of the changed country conditions exception in 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) on the basis that, since their 
hearing in 2000, they had become members of the ANP in the 
United States and that their membership in that group would 
subject them to persecution in Pakistan.  The petitioners have 
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submitted evidence indicating that members of the ANP have 
been targeted by extremists.  The record contains the 2009 
United States Department of State Human Rights Report on 
Pakistan, which reported that 100 political workers, some of 
whom belonged to the ANP, were killed in Karachi, Pakistan 
as the result of interparty clashes.  The report also noted that 
members of the ANP had been the targets of terrorist attacks. 
 
Despite that evidence, we agree with the BIA that this 
argument is unavailing.  This claim for asylum relief is based 
on changes in the petitioners’ personal circumstances in the 
United States and is not “based on changed country 
conditions” in Pakistan.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  The 
petitioners’ choice to engage in such political activities after 
being ordered deported does not support application of the 
changed country conditions exception in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  See Haddad v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 515, 
517 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that petitioner’s divorce was a 
“purely personal change in circumstances that does not 
constitute changed conditions or circumstances in Jordon”); 
Zheng v. Dep’t of Justice
 
, 416 F.3d 129, 130–31 (2d Cir. 
2005) (holding that the birth of petitioner’s children did not 
constitute changed country conditions).  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained why application 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) cannot be based on changed 
personal circumstances alone:   
It is quite a different situation, however, where 
a petitioner is seeking to reopen his asylum case 
due to circumstances entirely of his own 
making after being ordered to leave the United 
States.  In such a situation, it would be ironic, 
indeed, if petitioners . . . who have remained in 
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the United States illegally following an order of 
deportation[] were permitted to have a second 
and third bite at the apple . . . .  This apparent 
gaming of the system in an effort to avoid 
deportation is not tolerated by the existing 
regulatory scheme.  The law is clear that a 
petitioner must show changed country 
conditions in order to exceed the 90-day filing 
requirement for seeking to reopen removal 
proceedings.  A self-induced change in personal 
circumstances cannot suffice. 
 
Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted).  We agree that, where an alien intentionally alters 
his or her own circumstances, knowing that he or she has 
been ordered removed from the United States, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) does not properly apply.  See Larngar v. 
Holder
 
, 562 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2009).   
We also conclude that the BIA did not err in finding 
that the evidence of increased anti-American sentiment in 
Pakistan was immaterial to the petitioners’ case.  Although 
we acknowledge that Faras has been in the United States for 
the majority of his life and that both have been here for over 
twenty years, there is no cognizable social group of 
“secularized and westernized Pakistanis perceived to be 
affiliated with the United States.”  Ahmed v. Holder
 
, 611 
F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2010).    
[F]or a proposed social group to achieve 
cognizability (that is, to come within the 
compass of the statute), its members must share 
at least one common, immutable characteristic.  
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In addition, the shared characteristic or 
characteristics must make the group generally 
recognizable in the community and must be 
sufficiently particular to permit an accurate 
separation of members from non-members. 
 
Id. (citation omitted); see Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 
502 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2007).  The social group that the 
petitioners propose — of Pakistanis who have “become more 
acculturated to American culture, language and values than 
those of Pakistan” — calls for “subjective value judgments” 
and, thus, is not an easily definable group.  See Ahmed, 611 
F.3d at 94–95.  “Americanization is not an immutable 
characteristic.”  Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th 
Cir. 2011).  Nor is having an affiliation with or connection to 
the United States.  Ahmed, 611 F.3d at 94.  The social group 
that the petitioners propose is too amorphous to support an 
asylum application.  Moreover, the evidence submitted by the 
petitioners discusses anti-American sentiment in Pakistan but 
it does not specifically report persecution of Pakistanis who 
have returned from the United States to Pakistan.  Thus, the 
petitioners have not shown “a reasonable likelihood that 
[they] can establish that [they are] entitled to relief” on this 
basis.  Guo
 
, 386 F.3d at 563. 
 We further hold that the BIA’s finding that the 
petitioners failed to provide sufficient medical information to 
support a prima facie case for asylum was supported by 
substantial evidence.  The petitioners provided a medical 
record showing that, on February 4, 2011, Faras was 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder.  The record also contains an 
evaluation from a New Jersey hospital from November 2010 
stating that Mohammed suffered from mental depression due 
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to anxiety and a report from a different hospital on March 21, 
2011 diagnosing Mohammed with “adjustment disorder with 
mixed emotions.”  On the March 2011 hospital visit, 
Mohammed was discharged after his condition improved 
without any recommendation of follow-up care.   
 
The few medical documents the petitioners submitted 
provide very limited information about their mental health.  
More importantly, however, the petitioners did not establish 
how those particular diagnoses would cause them to be 
persecuted in Pakistan.  The evidence the petitioners 
submitted indicates that it is difficult to obtain mental health 
treatment in Pakistan.  The lack of access to mental health 
treatment alone, however, does not create a well-founded fear 
of persecution.  See Ixtlilco–Morales v. Keisler
 
, 507 F.3d 
651, 655–56 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding the BIA’s 
determination that the alien had “failed to establish that 
inadequacies in health care for HIV-positive individuals in 
Mexico was an attempt to persecute those with HIV”).  While 
some of the evidence in the record describes abuse of 
psychiatric patients and the social stigma attached to mental 
illness in Pakistan, we conclude that the BIA’s finding that 
the petitioners did not sufficiently demonstrate that they had a 
mental illness that would subject them to mistreatment upon 
return to Pakistan was supported by substantial evidence.  
 Finally, the petitioners argue that the BIA’s failure to 
address their evidence of changed country conditions was a 
procedural violation.  We have held that “the BIA must 
actually consider the evidence and argument that a party 
presents.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 
2008) (quotation marks omitted).  The BIA must engage in 
some analysis of the petitioner’s evidence but may do so in a 
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“‘summary fashion.’”  Id. at 268 (quoting Wang, 437 F.3d at 
275).  “The BIA must show that it reviewed the record and 
considered the evidence upon which the IJ relied, and it must 
explain why the record warrants [its conclusion].”  Huang
 
, 
620 F.3d at 387.  Although the BIA’s opinion in this case 
does not specifically mention all of the evidence that the 
petitioners submitted, it demonstrates that the BIA reviewed 
the record and sets forth in summary fashion why the record 
supports its conclusion.  Thus, the BIA sufficiently addressed 
the petitioners’ claims and evidence.   
For all of these reasons, we are not persuaded that the 
BIA abused its discretion in finding that the petitioners’ 
motion to reopen was untimely and that the changed country 
conditions exception in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) was 
inapplicable.   
 
IV. 
 
In accordance with the foregoing, we will deny the 
Attorney General’s motion to dismiss and we will deny the 
petition for review. 
 
